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In the past 15 years, there has been a surge in migration to the affluent democ-
racies. For example, the percent foreign born more than doubled in Ireland and 
more than quadrupled in Spain over the last decade – rising to 14.8 percent of 
the population in Ireland and 10.6 percent in Spain. Of course, the rise of im-
migration has not been uniform across all affluent democracies. Only 3 percent 
of Finland and 1.6 percent of Japan were foreign-born in 2005. Even though 
Germany has a sizable foreign-born population, the percent foreign-born actu-
ally declined modestly from 12.9 to 11 percent from 1995 to 2005. The U.S. gets 
a lot of credit for being a “nation of immigrants,” but new immigrants actually 
amounted to a greater share of the population in 1996 than 2006. Thus, the most 
important change might actually be the remarkable diversity in the extent to 
which affluent democracies have experienced rising immigration.
What are the consequences of this rising immigration for the politics of social 
policy? Scholars, commentators and politicians have presented a variety of 
claims for why immigration poses a serious challenge to the generous social 
policies of Europe and other countries. Our research challenges these claims 
and ultimately concludes that rising immigration does not undermine the wel-
fare state. We specifically investigate what we call the “public support” for the 
welfare state – the public’s beliefs, preferences, and attitudes favoring social 
policies. 
The argument that immigration threatens the welfare state has emerged partly 
because countries with generous welfare states have traditionally been viewed 
as more ethnically homogenous than countries with weak welfare states. The 
best example of this is the U.S., with its thin social policies and greater ethnic 
heterogeneity. Scholars have demonstrated that ethnicity, race and religion 
were more important sources of identity than social class for Americans at the 
beginning of the 20th century. While workers in Europe were collectively mobi-
lizing and pressuring governments to expand social insurance and healthcare, 
American workers were bitterly divided by race and religion. In her influential 
book The Color of Welfare, sociologist Jill Quadagno argues that ethnic and racial 
divisions constrained the development of the American welfare state. Social 
policies purposefully excluded racial minorities, and race “became embedded in 
the state when welfare programs were enacted,” and was the “central social 
dynamic” shaping the politics of social policy. Even today, Americans are more 
likely to oppose welfare if they reside in proximity to larger African American 
populations. 
In his book Why Americans Hate Welfare, Martin Gilens argues that Americans 
view welfare as rewarding the undeserving poor, Blacks as lazy and undeserv-
ing, and Blacks as the primary beneficiaries of welfare. Gilens demonstrates that 
these perceptions are reflected in and amplified by the media, which dramati-
cally overrepresents Blacks in depictions of the poor. The implication of this 
scholarship is that as other affluent democracies encounter the greater ethnic 
heterogeneity that results from immigration and become more like the U.S., 
public support for the welfare state will decline. There is already accumulating 
evidence that rising immigration in Europe has elevated the perception that 
immigrants exploit the welfare system. Such views that minorities dispropor-
tionately benefit from welfare are likely to undermine public support for wel-
fare generally.
Multicultural welfare politics 
 Immi gration mostly has no effect on 
welfare attitudes
David Brady and Ryan Finnigan
Kurzgefasst: In den vergangenen Jah-
ren wurde immer wieder Besorgnis 
über die Auswirkungen von Einwan-
derung auf die Sozialpolitik geäußert. 
Eine zentrale Frage lautet, ob zuneh-
mende Einwanderung dem Verhältnis 
von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern zum 
Sozialstaat schadet. Aktuelle For-
schungsergebnisse am Beispiel von 
17 entwickelten Demokratien zeigen, 
dass dem nicht so ist. Es gibt sogar 
Hinweise darauf, dass Einwanderung 
in einigen Fällen zu einer positiveren 
Einstellung zum Sozialstaat führt.  
Summary: In recent years, there has 
been increased concern about the 
consequences of immigration on so-
cial policy. One central question is 
whether rising immigration under-
mines the public’s belief about and at-
titudes toward the welfare state. Cur-
rent research investigating 17 
affluent democracies shows that im-
migration mostly has no effect on 
public support for the welfare state. 
There is even evidence that flows of 
immigration actually increase some 
welfare attitudes. 
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A slightly different version of the argument emphasizes what scholars call “eth-
nic fractionalization” in preventing solidarity among citizens. Ethnic fractional-
ization occurs when there is a diversity of ethnic groups, and those groups are 
sharply split along socio-economic lines and as a share of the population. As 
mentioned above, scholars have long contended that homogeneity is a key basis 
of solidarity in and trust of one’s fellow residents. Being the same ethnicity and 
speaking the same language make class-based solidarity easier and increase the 
sense of community in people’s minds. According to this line of reasoning, the 
native-born lack solidarity with immigrants and have a preference for “in-
group” members who share cultural customs and physical appearances. 
In fractionalized societies, people seem to be less willing to support investments 
in public goods like public transportation and education. Recent studies show 
that societies with more ethnic fractionalization have less public spending as a 
share of the economy. The concern with rising immigration has been that eth-
nic fractionalization will emerge as society becomes divided into affluent na-
tive-born residents and marginalized immigrants forming ethnic and religious 
minority groups. One of the most prominent accounts within this literature is 
provided by economists Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser’s book Fighting 
Poverty in the U.S. and Europe. They explicitly hypothesize that increased ethnic 
fractionalization due to immigration will undermine the generosity of European 
welfare states. According to them, right wing and even centrist politicians will 
use anti-immigrant rhetoric as tools to dismantle social policies. Ominously, 
they predict: “As Europe has become more diverse, Europeans have increasingly 
been susceptible to exactly the same form of racist, anti-welfare demagoguery 
that worked so well in the United States. We shall see whether the generous 
European welfare state can really survive in a heterogeneous society.”
Despite mounting claims that immigration undermines public support for the 
welfare state, a smaller skeptical literature has begun to emerge. Scholars in the 
skeptical camp point to inconsistencies in the empirical evidence supporting 
the arguments above. In fact, the first author of this essay authored (with Beck-
field and Seeleib-Kaiser) an article in the American Sociological Review that 
showed that there is no association between increased immigration and a 
smaller welfare state. Others suggest that any tradeoff between ethnic hetero-
geneity and redistribution is overstated. While the U.S. was traditionally more 
heterogeneous than Europe, Australia and Canada are much more heteroge-
neous than Japan – yet public support for the welfare state is significantly low-
er in Japan than in Australia and Canada. Further, the recent concern with im-
migration neglects the fact that scholars have demonstrated other more 
powerful influences on social policy attitudes. If these established influences 
are the paramount predictors of welfare attitudes, immigration is likely to play 
a marginal role.
We entered this debate with some expectation that immigration would under-
mine public support for the welfare state. Our research utilized data on attitudes 
regarding social policy for 17 affluent democracies in 2006 and 12 in both 1996 
and 2006. This public opinion data from the International Social Survey Pro-
gram (ISSP) was linked with information about the stock and flows of immigra-
tion in each country. We assessed six different welfare attitudes about whether 
people feel it “should be the government’s responsibility to… reduce income dif-
ferences between rich and poor… [or] provide a job for everyone who wants 
one… [or] provide a decent standard of living for the old” or remedy unemploy-
ment, housing, and healthcare. The analyses controlled for a country’s economy 
and history of social policy, and the individual’s social class, family characteris-
tics, religion, age, and gender. Our sample included countries with high and low 
levels of immigration, with booming and struggling economies, and with mea-
ger and extensive welfare states.
Our analyses mostly failed to support the hypothesis that immigration under-
mines public support for the welfare state. The percent foreign-born, annual net 
migration, and the ten-year change in the percent foreign-born do not have 
consistent negative effects on welfare attitudes. There is some evidence that the 
percent foreign-born significantly undermines the specific welfare attitude 
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that government “should provide a job for everyone who wants one.” However, 
there is much more evidence showing that net migration and change in percent 
foreign-born have surprisingly positive effects on welfare attitudes. These two 
measures of immigration flows are associated with greater support for attitudes 
regarding retirement, housing, and healthcare especially. 
There is even some evidence that the percent foreign-born increases support 
for attitudes regarding retirement. Thus, the evidence is quite mixed and most-
ly contradicts the literatures discussed earlier. While some countries with in-
creased immigration have lower levels of support for the welfare state, even 
more countries exhibit the opposite pattern. For example, net migration amount-
ed to less than one-tenth of a percent of Japan in 2005, and Japan had the lowest 
level of support for the view that government has a responsibility to provide 
housing (only 38 percent in favor). By contrast, Spain had the highest level of net 
migration (5.8 percent) and the highest support for the housing attitude (96 
percent).
Why do countries with high immigration flows tend to have higher public sup-
port for the welfare state? It could be that immigration increases the perception 
of higher unemployment and more competition for jobs, and such perceptions 
tend to trigger support for the welfare state. Scholars have shown that percep-
tions of immigration as an economic risk or threat are positively associated 
with a preference for redistribution. Thus, heightened immigration could induce 
respondents to favor a greater welfare state to compensate for and protect 
themselves from what they perceive as economic competition from immigrants. 
Similarly, it could be that immigration flows lead residents to feel vulnerable 
and insecure. A sense of vulnerability and insecurity could create a perception 
of unmet societal needs, and lead to a desire for increased welfare state inter-
ventions. In fact, our analyses show that net migration is significantly positively 
associated with a preference for greater welfare spending on health, pensions 
and unemployment.
Our results challenge much conventional wisdom and many scholars and com-
mentators. In the process, we encourage greater caution with bold claims about 
the negative effects of immigration or ethnic heterogeneity for welfare states. 
We show that it is essential to compare a broader set of countries, to examine 
those countries over time, and to get past simplistic U.S.-Europe differences. We 
also demonstrate that examining multiple welfare attitudes provides a more 
informative picture of the effects of immigration. Our research leads us to hy-
pothesize that citizens might have a bifurcated response to rising immigration. 
On one hand, many citizens will prefer more extensive and generous social 
policies. On the other hand, there is convincing evidence that rising immigra-
tion contributes to anti-immigrant attitudes and support for extremist right-
wing political parties. We even suggest that these two outcomes might be com-
patible for a segment of the population that has less education, is marginally 
employed or unemployed, and has lower incomes and more insecurity.
In sum, our study shows the value of cross-national survey research on impor-
tant social problems and challenges facing modern societies. The availability of 
cross-national survey data and the statistical techniques to analyze such data 
have increased substantially in recent years. Social scientists are better poised 
now than ever to provide convincing answers to questions like ours. Ultimately, 
we find very little evidence that immigration poses a threat to the welfare state. 
Rather, immigration and ethnic heterogeneity may actually be compatible with 
generous social policies. Though many politicians and commentators provoke 
fear by talking about the failures of multiculturalism, these claims have little 
empirical support. Immigration does not clearly reduce public support for the 
welfare state and some aspects of immigration seem to increase the public’s 
beliefs in and preferences for social policy.
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